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DETENTION DECISIONS AND ACCESS TO
HABEAS CORPUS FOR IMMIGRANTS
FACING DEPORTATION
Nancy Morawetz*
Abstract: In the wake of the recent Supreme Court decisions on the legal
rights of “enemy combatants,” this Article highlights the continuing prob-
lems of immigration detainees and their lack of access to adequate judicial
process. Based on the author’s extensive research into habeas corpus ac-
tions ªled by inmates in the Oakdale Federal Detention Facility, this Article
explores the consequences of limiting habeas actions to courts in the terri-
torial site of the prison. Because the Federal District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana refuses to issue stays of removal, detainees are de-
ported before their habeas actions can be judged on the merits, and
consequently are denied an adequate remedy for illegal government
action.
Introduction
The year 2004 will be remembered for the landmark cases that de-
cided whether the government can create a legal black hole in which
the claims of “enemy combatants” are either fully insulated from the
courts or are subjected to review that lacks any element of standard
conceptions of due process. In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court re-
jected the government’s argument that detainees held in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, cannot bring habeas corpus claims to challenge their deten-
tion.1 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, it rejected the government’s effort to limit
drastically the degree to which habeas courts can review claims brought
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1 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2688–89 (2004). Individuals held in custody “in violation of the Con-
stitution or the laws and treaties of the United States” may apply to the courts for a writ of
habeas corpus to secure judicial review of the Executive action responsible for their deten-
tion. Id. at 2692 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3) (2000)).
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by U.S. citizens held as “enemy combatants.”2 The Court’s rulings were
widely hailed as preserving the rule of law.3 While commentators rec-
ognized the importance of the Rasul and Hamdi decisions, they gave
short shrift to the decision in a companion case, Rumsfeld v. Padilla. The
press viewed the Padilla decision as a “nonruling,” in which the Court
had simply concluded that Padilla’s lawyers had chosen the wrong
court.4 The underlying implication was that, should the case be ªled in
the correct court, all of Padilla’s substantive rights, as well as those of
other U.S. citizens held as enemy combatants, would be protected.
But the seemingly technical ruling in Padilla is, in fact, of enor-
mous importance.5 The Court held that Padilla had to ªle his habeas
claim wherever the government chose to detain him.6 According to the
Court, because he was taken to South Carolina and held there in a mili-
tary brig, the only proper respondent to a habeas petition was the brig’s
commander, and the only proper court was the district court in South
Carolina.7
The practical question left open by the Padilla decision is whether
the government’s power to choose the site of detention, and hence the
venue for a habeas action, will leave petitioners with adequate access to
judicial review.8 Some may suspect that the government selected the
South Carolina site for Padilla’s detention precisely because it helped
to compel litigation in a court that was sympathetic to the government.
                                                                                                                     
2 See 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004).
3 Linda Greenhouse, Access to the Courts, N.Y. Times, June 29, 2004, at A1; Charles
Lane, Justices Move to Deªne Detainees’ Court Access: Order Seeks Opinion From 9th Circuit About
Where a Case Should Be Heard, Wash. Post, July 1, 2004, at A7; Editorial, The Due Process
Rights Afªrmed, Hartford Courant, June 30, 2004, at A12.
4 See Greenhouse, supra note 3; see also Andrew McCarthy, A Mixed Bag, Nat’l Rev.
Online, June 30, 2004, ¶¶ 2, 5–6, 23 at http://www.nationalreview.com/mccarthy/
mccarthy200406300915.asp. (“In the most interesting case, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, the court
issued its least interesting decision–ducking [the question] on procedural grounds . . . .”).
At least one legal commentator, however, has recognized the signiªcance of the proce-
dural issues in the court of appeals’ decision in Padilla. See Brian O’Donoghue, Who’s the
Boss?: Armentero, Padilla and the Proper Respondent in Federal Habeas Corpus Law, 22 Yale L.
& Pol’y Rev. 441, 441 (2004).
5 See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2727 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6 See id. at 2722.
7 Id. at 2716, 2724. The court applied the “immediate custodian” rule, under which
habeas claims that are “core challenges” to physical custody must be brought against the de-
tainee’s warden in the absence of any applicable exceptions to the rule. Id. at 2718, 2724.
8 See id.
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Time will tell what kind of a hearing Padilla and others similarly situ-
ated will receive in the government’s chosen court.
With respect to detainees in immigration cases, however, a factual
record is developing of the impact of limiting habeas claims to courts
sitting in the territorial site of the detained individual. Before the Pa-
dilla decision was issued, many courts, including the circuit where this
conference was held, took the position that habeas actions by nonciti-
zens who are challenging their deportation must be ªled in the court
where those individuals are detained.9 Since the government has broad
authority to detain immigrants challenging deportation orders, the
courts that followed this approach essentially allowed the government
to select the district court that would review habeas challenges to the
legality of deportation orders.10
The impact of these pre-Padilla decisions has not been studied ex-
haustively. Evidence indicates, however, that the pre-Padilla decisions
that transferred immigration cases to the site of detention allowed the
government to execute removal orders prior to any judicial scrutiny of
those orders’ legality.11 This record demonstrates the grave dangers of
extending the rule of Padilla beyond that case and into any situation in
which the government has the power to choose the situs of detention.
It also demonstrates the wisdom of the Court’s conclusion that any rule
on the locus of habeas actions is not a matter of subject matter jurisdic-
tion and should be relaxed when it would reward abuse by the govern-
ment or otherwise fail to provide fair access to the writ.12
The Oakdale Federal Detention Facility (“Oakdale”), built in a
remote region of Louisiana, houses over eight hundred detainees at
any one time.13 Local parish jails and private facilities in the area house
                                                                                                                     
9 See Vasquez v. Reno, 233 F.3d 688, 690 (1st Cir. 2000); Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d
314, 316 (6th Cir. 2003).
10 See, e.g., Vasquez, 233 F.3d at 694 (asserting, ironically, that to allow habeas petitioners
to name the Attorney General rather than their immediate custodian as respondent would
encourage rampant forum shopping among petitioners).
11 See discussion infra Section I.
12 See Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2717 n.7 (noting that subject matter jurisdiction is not in-
volved); id. at 2729 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting circumstances in which the
Padilla rule would not be applied). Justice Kennedy explains that, because the locus of
habeas actions turns on personal jurisdiction or venue, other federal courts still retain
subject matter jurisdiction and might be able to hear cases, for example, when the gov-
ernment is obstructive. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
13See generally Federal Bureau of Prisons, Weekly Population Report, at www.bop.gov/
weekly.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2004) (providing weekly updates on prison populations at
various federal prison sites).
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additional detainees.14 In a study of habeas actions docketed in the
courts in the Western District of Louisiana (WDLA), I learned that the
federal district court that handles cases of pro se Oakdale detainees
takes the position that immigration law bars a habeas court from issu-
ing a stay of deportation.15 As a result, little doubt exists that when the
government chooses to transfer a detainee to Oakdale, it greatly in-
creases the chances that the individual will be deported prior to any
substantive review of the case.16
The consequences of these stay practices were magniªed when
the reviewing court for cases from the WDLA, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, issued its decision in Zalawadia v. Ashcroft.17 In
Zalawadia, the court held that if a person is deported during the pen-
dency of a habeas action, the court loses jurisdiction to provide a ju-
dicial remedy other than vacating the illegal removal order.18 Zala-
wadia’s claim was similar to that of Enrico St. Cyr, who had prevailed
in 2001 in his case before the Supreme Court.19 Like St. Cyr, Zala-
wadia argued that he should have been allowed to present equities
that counseled against his deportation, and that the Attorney General
improperly concluded that she lacked the power to conduct a hearing
into such equities.20
                                                                                                                     
14 See Mark Dow, American Gulag: Inside U.S. Immigration Prisons 176–77 (2004)
(describing Pine Prairie facility).
15 See discussion infra Section I.
16 Transfer to Oakdale has many other consequences. As others have documented, de-
tention generally limits access to counsel. See Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representa-
tion for Detained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1647, 1664–65
(1997). Although there is a modest project to provide representation to these detainees
during their immigration proceedings, there is no legal service provider who will take a
case to court. See Frank Etheridge, Exile in Oakdale, Gambit Wkly., Aug. 10, 2004, ¶ 22, at
http://www.bestofneworleans.com/dispatch/2004-08-10/cover_story.html (reporting that
the Catholic Legal Immigration Network’s attorney who provides legal rights presentations
at the Oakdale facility is not permitted to engage in any one-on-one consultations with
detainees). In addition, those transferred do not have access to witnesses and documents
for their hearings and lack basic human contact with friends and family. See id.
17 See Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 2004). The WDLA refused to
grant Zalawadia a stay of deportation and dismissed his habeas claim. Id. at 296. Zalawadia
was deported while his Fifth Circuit appeal was pending. Id.
18 Id. at 301.
19 See id. at 295–96; INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 292, 325 (2001) (holding that discre-
tionary relief extends to aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements
and who would have been eligible for such relief at the time of their plea).
20 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 292; Zalawadia, 371 F.3d at 295–96.
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Zalawadia did all he could to preserve his rights; he retained coun-
sel and pursued appeals up through the court system, including to the
Supreme Court.21 His case was held in abeyance pending the outcome
in St. Cyr, after which it was remanded for reconsideration.22 Through
counsel, Zalawadia continued to argue his case through both the dis-
trict court and the Fifth Circuit, ultimately persuading the court that he
had been deported improperly.23 The court issued an opinion with
broad language stating that the only relief Zalawadia could obtain was
vacatur of his removal order. The court refused to order Zalawadia’s
return or any other relief to ensure preservation of his rights.24
The combined effect of the stay practices of the Western District
of Louisiana and the Zalawadia decision is to give the government the
power to move noncitizens to a law-free zone.25 Although immigration
detainees can nominally take their case to court, the court can neither
protect them from removal prior to, nor at the conclusion of their
case.26
As of this writing, the circuit courts are considering whether im-
migration habeas cases ªt within the “territorial” jurisdiction rule that
was applied in Padilla.27 However that issue is decided, the reality that
                                                                                                                     
21 Zalawadia, 371 F.3d at 295–96.
22 Id. at 296.
23 Id. at 296, 301.
24 The government appears to recognize the far-reaching and troubling implications
of the language used in the Zalawadia opinion. In its opposition to rehearing in that case,
the government argued that it made no practical difference for Zalawadia whether the
court exercised broader remedial power. Response of Respondent-Appellee to Petition for
Panel Rehearing, Zalawadia (No. 03-30155). Zalawadia himself did not object to purchas-
ing his own ticket, and, in the context of that case, the government had already made ar-
rangements with Zalawadia’s counsel that would ease proof of his status for purposes of
traveling to the United States. Furthermore, the legal error in Zalawadia’s case was denial
of a hearing, for which he remained eligible under the government’s promised restoration
of lawful permanent resident status. One can only hope that the sweeping language of the
court’s opinion will be read in light of these speciªc circumstances. For petitioners of
lesser means in cases with lower proªles, only a court order requiring the government to
arrange their return and requiring the provision of travel documents has any chance of
remedying a wrongful removal.
25 I am indebted to Hiroshi Motomura, for coining a similar phrase in connection to a
discussion of this paper at the University of Maryland’s 2004 Immigration Professors Work-
shop.
26 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 325; Zalawadia, 371 F.3d at 301.
27 See, e.g., Armentero v. INS, 382 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2004) (vacating prior decision on
proper custodian and deferring resubmission of case pending oral argument); Bell v.
Ashcroft, 2003 WL 22358800, appeal docketed, No. 03-2737 (2d Cir. 2004).
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no petitioner can obtain a stay in the WDLA and real possibility that
the Fifth Circuit will deny a full judicial remedy at the end of the pro-
ceedings means that the WDLA is a far different habeas forum from
those that offer petitioners a chance to prevent inappropriate depor-
tations and to be released into their communities when they prevail in
their cases.
Part I of this Article reviews the results of the study of stay prac-
tices in the WDLA. Part II discusses the Zalawadia case and how it has
magniªed the consequences of application of a rule mandating that
habeas actions be brought where the government has chosen to de-
tain immigrants. Part III explores the implications of the WDLA’s stay
practices and Zalawadia for rules governing the choice of forum in
immigration habeas actions.
I. Stay Practices in the Western District of Louisiana
All Oakdale detainees whose cases are transferred to the WDLA
face a court that, as a matter of policy, will not provide a stay of re-
moval.28 The district court for the WDLA takes the position that under
INA § 242(g), no power exists to stay deportation irrespective of the
merits of the case.29 As a result, no one who seeks a stay in the court
that handles Oakdale detainees succeeds. Similarly, as a matter of sua
sponte practice, the district court vacates stays entered by other courts.30
This study looked systematically at cases during two speciªc time
intervals: the six months following the decision in INS v. St. Cyr and
the three months following the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Flores-Garza
v. INS.31 The ªrst period represents the time in which the Supreme
                                                                                                                     
28 This ªnding was reported in an earlier publication, Nancy Morawetz, Oakdale Justice:
Routine Vacatur of Stays in the Western District of Louisiana, 8 Bender’s Immigr. Bull. 6 (2004).
29 See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 242(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1998)
(“Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising
from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate
cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.”). Pursuant to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (AADC),
this provision only bars review over discretionary decisions regarding the commencement,
continuation or execution of removal orders. See 525 U.S. 471, 471–72 (1999).
30 See, e.g., Solis v. Ashcroft, No. 2:01 Civ. 1732, at 1, 2 (W.D. La. Dec. 21, 2001);
Bennett v. Ashcroft, No. 2:01 Civ. 1747, at 1, 2 (W.D. La. Dec. 7, 2001); Bello v. Reno, No.
2:01 Civ. 1297, at 1, 2 (W.D. La. Aug. 7, 2001).
31 See generally INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Flores-Garza v. INS, 328 F.3d 797 (5th
Cir. 2003). The ªrst period included all cases on PACER that were docketed in the WDLA
between July 1, 2001 and December 31, 2001, and in which the words “Reno,” “Ashcroft,”
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Court had made it clear that habeas jurisdiction existed as a means to
challenge the legality of deportation orders.32 Over the course of
these six months, detainees’ arguments often contended that their
cases should fall within the ambit of the St Cyr ruling.33 The second
time period focuses on the time in which the Fifth Circuit had further
clariªed the scope of habeas jurisdiction, rejecting government re-
quests to dismiss not only petitions for review, but also habeas actions
by individuals who argued that their removal orders were illegal.34 For
both intervals, I examined cases that had been transferred from other
courts. Cases from both time periods revealed that, when confronted
with a question of whether a habeas petitioner can obtain a stay of
removal, the district court judges handling the cases of detainees at
Oakdale uniformly ruled that they lacked jurisdiction to enter a stay.35
As a result, stays entered by the transferring court were consistently
vacated and applications for stays denied.
                                                                                                                     
or “immigration” appeared in the caption. The second period includes all cases docketed
between May 1, 2003 and August 1, 2003 in which the words “Ashcroft” or “immigration”
appear in the caption.
32 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 312 (holding that federal courts have habeas jurisdiction un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 2241 notwithstanding the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252).
33 See, e.g., Flores-Garza, 328 F.3d at 801; Zalawadia, 371 F.3d at 296.
34 Flores-Garza, 328 F.3d at 799, 802–03.
35 Cases in the WDLA are assigned to one of ªve divisions of that court. Interview with
Robert Shemwell, Clerk of the Court, The District Court for the Western District of Louisi-
ana (Nov. 24, 2003). Cases of detainees housed at the Federal Detention Center in Oak-
dale are assigned to the Lake Charles Division. Id. During the time period following the St.
Cyr decision, Judge James T. Trimble, Jr. and Judge Edwin F. Hunter, Jr. served as the dis-
trict court judges in that division. Currently, Judge Trimble and Judge Patricia Minaldi
handle the cases in this division. See Robert H. Shemwell, Guide to Practice in the
Western District of Louisiana, at v (2003), available at http://www.lawd.uscourts.gov/
guide/guide.pdf (showing that the only judges currently in the Lake Charles Division are
Senior Judge Trimble, Judge Minaldi, and Magistrate Judge Alonzo P. Wilson). In all cases
in the study, Magistrate Judge Wilson wrote the recommended decisions in the cases of
Oakdale detainees whose cases were transferred to the WDLA. See id. I have identiªed one
case ªled by counsel in another division of the WDLA where a temporary restraining order
was granted in a removal case that included Oakdale detainees among the petitioners. See
Mohamed v. Ashcroft, No. 02 Civ. 2484, slip op. at 1 (W.D. La. Aug. 4, 2003) (granting
petitioners’ motion to stay removal); Mohamed, No. 02 Civ. 2484, slip op. at 1, 5–6 (W.D.
La. July 27, 2003)(denying petitioners’ motion to stay removal in case challenging removal
of Somalis to a country without a functioning government). Mohamed was ªled in the
Monroe Division of the WDLA by attorneys on behalf of detainees in the WDLA with
claims regarding removal to Somalia. See Mohamed, No. 02 Civ. 2484, slip op. at 1, 5–6
(W.D. La. July 27, 2003). When cases are ªled by individuals pro se or are transferred by
other courts, they are invariably assigned to the Lake Charles Division.
20 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 25:13
Table 1 presents data on cases transferred in the six-month pe-
riod following the St. Cyr decision.
Table 1: Stay Decisions by the WDLA in cases of Oakdale detainees transferred from
other courts and docketed between 7/1/01 and 12/31/01
WDLA rulings on
stays
Finding no jurisdic-
tion for stay
Finding jurisdiction
and deciding stay
issue on merits
Ruling in cases trans-
ferred with stays
936 937 0
Rulings in cases trans-
ferred without stays 938 939 0
Total WDLA rulings of
stay requests in trans-
ferred cases
18 18 0
Every opinion issued by the WDLA on the stay issue for Oakdale
detainees states the same view: that there is no jurisdiction to issue a
stay in a case that challenges a removal order.40 In every opinion re-
                                                                                                                     
36 Solis, No. 2:01 Civ. 1732, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 21, 2001); Bennett, No. 2:01 Civ. 1747, at
1 (W.D. La. Dec. 7, 2001); Olendan-Moore v. Ashcroft, No. 01 Civ. 1893, at 1 (W.D. La.
Dec. 7, 2001); Riley v. Ashcroft, No. 01 Civ. 1549, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 7, 2001); Jacques v.
Ashcroft, No. 01 Civ. 2160, at 1 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2001); Bettune v. Ashcroft, No. 01
Civ.1474, at 1 (W.D. La. Sept. 13, 2001); Sanchez v. Ashcroft, No. 01 Civ. 1476, at 1 (W.D.
La. Sept. 13, 2001); Rezzouq v. Ashcroft, No. 01 Civ. 1262, at 1 (W.D. La. Sep. 7, 2001);
Bello v. Reno, No. 2:01 Civ. 1297, at 1 (W.D. La. Aug. 7, 2001).
37 See cases cited supra note 36.
38 Gelin v. Ashcroft, No. 01 Civ. 2243, at 1 (W.D. La. Jan. 24, 2002); Llewellyn v.
Ashcroft, No. 2:01 Civ. 2244, at 1 (W.D. La. Jan. 22, 2002); Williams v. Ashcroft, No. 01 Civ.
2319, at 1 (W.D. La. Jan. 18, 2002); Gajadhar v. INS, No. 2:01 Civ. 2157, at 1 (W.D. La. Jan.
2, 2002); Benavides-Rodriguez v. Ashcroft, No. 01 Civ. 2032, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 26, 2001);
Balfour v. Ashcroft, No. CV-2:01 Civ. 1519, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 21, 2001); Tavares v.
Ashcroft, No. CV-2:01 Civ. 1521, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 21, 2001); Llewellyn v. Ashcroft, CV-01-
2244 (W.D. La. Jan. 22, 2002); Gomes v. Reno, No. CV-01 Civ. 2069, at 1 (W.D. La. Nov. 16,
2001); Ozuru v. Reno, No. CV-2:01 Civ. 1983, at 1 (W.D. La. Nov. 7, 2001).
39 See cases cited supra note 38.
40 See Gelin, No. 01 Civ. 2243, at 1 (W.D. La. Jan. 24, 2002); Llewellyn, No. 2:01 Civ. 2244,
at 1 (W.D. La. Jan. 22, 2002); Williams, No. 01 Civ. 2319, at 1 (W.D. La. Jan. 18, 2002); Ga-
jadhar, No. 2:01 Civ. 2157, at 1 (W.D. La. Jan. 2, 2002); Benavides-Rodriguez, No. 01 Civ.
2032, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 26, 2001); Balfour, No. 2:01 Civ. 1519, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 21,
2001); Solis, No. 2:01 Civ. 1732, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 21, 2001); Tavares, No. 2:01 Civ. 1521, at
1 (W.D. La. Dec. 21, 2001); Bennett, No. 2:01 Civ. 1747, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 7, 2001); Olen-
dan-Moore, No. 01 Civ. 1893, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 7, 2001); Riley, No. 01 Civ. 1549, at 1 (W.D.
La. Dec. 7, 2001); Gomes, No. 01 Civ. 2069, at 1 (W.D. La. Nov. 16, 2001); Ozuru, No. 2:01
Civ. 1983, at 1 (W.D. La. Nov. 7, 2001); Jacques, No. 01 Civ. 2160, at 1 (W.D. La. Oct. 30,
2001); Bettune, No. 01 Civ. 1474, at 1 (W.D. La. Sept. 13, 2001); Sanchez, No. 01 Civ. 1476, at
1 (W.D. La. Sept. 13, 2001); Rezzouq, No. 01 Civ. 1262, at 1 (W.D. La. Sept. 7, 2001); Bello,
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ferred to in Table 1, the district court states that INA § 242(g) bars
courts from interfering with the execution of a removal order.41 After
concluding that there is no jurisdiction under any circumstances to is-
sue a stay, the opinions issued during this time period generally also
cited INA § 242(a)(2)(B) as making stay decisions purely discretionary
and INA § 242(f) as requiring a showing that the removal order is pro-
hibited as a matter of law.42 Notably, however, these alternative grounds
were often merely footnoted.43
                                                                                                                     
No. 01 Civ. 1297, at 1 (W.D. La. Aug. 7, 2001). Similar language is found in a published
decision from the WDLA, issued prior to St. Cyr. See Naidoo v. INS, 39 F. Supp. 2d 755, 762
(W.D. La. 1999).
41 See INA § 242(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g); Gelin, No. 01 Civ. 1262, at 1 (W.D. La. Jan. 24,
2002); Llewellyn, No. 2:01 Civ. 2244, at 1 (W.D. La. Jan. 22, 2002); Williams, No. 01 Civ.
2319, at 1 (W.D. La. Jan. 18, 2002); Gajadhar, No. 2:01 Civ. 2157, at 1 (W.D. La. Jan. 2,
2002); Benavides-Rodriguez, No. 01 Civ. 2032, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 26, 2001); Balfour, No. 2:01
Civ. 1519, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 21, 2001); Solis, No. 2:01 Civ. 1732, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 21,
2001); Tavares, No. 2:01 Civ. 1521, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 21, 2001); Bennett, No. 2:01 Civ.
1747, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 7, 2001); Olendan-Moore, No. 01 Civ. 1893, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 7,
2001); Riley, No. 01 Civ. 1549, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 7, 2001); Gomes, No. 01 Civ. 2069, at 1
(W.D. La. Nov. 16, 2001); Ozuru, No. 2:01 Civ. 1983, at 1 (W.D. La. Nov. 7, 2001); Jacques,
No. 01 Civ. 2160, at 1 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2001); Bettune, No. 01 Civ. 1474, at 1 (W.D. La.
Sept. 13, 2001); Sanchez, No. 01 Civ. 1476, at 1 (W.D. La. Sept. 13, 2001); Rezzouq, No. 01
Civ. 1262, at 1 (W.D. La. Sept. 7, 2001); Bello, No. 01 Civ. 1297, at 1 (W.D. La. Aug. 7,
2001).
42 See INA § 242(a)(2)(B), (f), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (f); Gelin, No. 01 Civ. 1262, at
1 (W.D. La. Jan. 24, 2002); Llewellyn, No. 2:01 Civ. 2244, at 1 (W.D. La. Jan. 22, 2002); Wil-
liams, No. 01 Civ. 2319, at 1 (W.D. La. Jan. 18, 2002); Gajadhar, No. 2:01 Civ. 2157, at 1
(W.D. La. Jan. 2, 2002); Benavides-Rodriguez, No. 01 Civ. 2032, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 26, 2001);
Balfour, No. 2:01 Civ. 1519, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 21, 2001); Solis, No. 2:01 Civ. 1732, at 1
(W.D. La. Dec. 21, 2001); Tavares, No. 2:01 Civ. 1521, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 21, 2001); Bennett,
No. 2:01 Civ. 1747, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 7, 2001); Olendan-Moore, No. 01 Civ. 1893, at 1 (W.D.
La. Dec. 7, 2001); Riley, No. 01 Civ. 1549, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 7, 2001); Gomes, No. 01 Civ.
2069, at 1 (W.D. La. Nov. 16, 2001); Jacques, No. 01 Civ. 2160, at 1 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2001);
Bettune, No. 01 Civ. 1474, at 1 (W.D. La. Sept. 13, 2001); Sanchez, No. 01 Civ. 1476, at 1
(W.D. La. Sept. 13, 2001); Rezzouq, No. 01 Civ. 1262, at 1 (W.D. La. Sept. 7, 2001).
43 See, e.g., Gelin, No. 01 Civ. 1262, at 1 nn.1, 2 (W.D. La. Jan. 24, 2002); Williams, No.
01 Civ. 2319, at 1 nn.1, 2 (W.D. La. Jan. 18, 2002); Balfour, No. 2:01 Civ. 1519, at 1 nn.1, 2
(W.D. La. Dec. 21, 2001); Tavares, No. 2:01 Civ. 1521, at 1 nn.1, 2 (W.D. La. Dec. 21, 2001);
Olendan-Moore, No. 01 Civ. 1893, at 1 nn.1, 2 (W.D. La. Dec. 7, 2001); Riley, No. 01 Civ.
1549, at 1 nn.1, 2 (W.D. La. Dec. 7, 2001); Gomes, No. 01 Civ. 2069, at 1 nn.1, 2 (W.D. La.
Nov. 16, 2001); Jacques, No. 01 Civ. 2160, at 1 nn.1, 2 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2001); Bettune, No.
01 Civ. 1474, at 1 nn.1, 2 (W.D. La. Sept. 13, 2001); Sanchez, No. 01 Civ. 1476, at 2 nn.1, 2
(W.D. La. Sept. 13, 2001); Rezzouq, No. 01 Civ. 1262, at 2 nn.1, 2 (W.D. La. Sept. 7, 2001).
This study did not seek to assess whether stays ought to have been granted in these cases.
This question turns on a number of factors, including the proper standard for the issuance
of stays. According to the WDLA’s stated policy, no stay would be granted regardless of the
strength of the claim. See cases cited supra note 41.
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In the more recent time period studied—cases docketed between
May 1, 2003 and August 1, 2003—the WDLA judges hearing pro se
cases from Oakdale detainees as well as cases transferred from other
courts continued to reiterate the view that they lack jurisdiction to
stay a removal order.44 During this time period, the WDLA issued four
opinions and one additional report and recommendation on stays of
removal sought by Oakdale detainees.45 Three of these cases involved
cases transferred from other districts with a stay of removal.46 Two in-
volved stay requests adjudicated in the WDLA.47 All of the opinions
concluded that a habeas court has no power to issue a stay, and none
stated any alternative grounds for denial.48 This conclusion is found
in opinions issued by both of the current judges in the Lake Charles
Division of the WDLA, the court that handles all habeas petitions ªled
by Oakdale detainees.49 In any case wherein the transferring court
had issued a stay, the WDLA predictably lifted the stay.50
                                                                                                                     
44 See Andrade, No. 2:03 Civ. 1307, at 1 (W.D. La. Aug. 25, 2003); Byªeld v. Ashcroft, No.
2:03 Civ. 1283, at 1 (W.D. La. Aug. 14, 2003); Telfort v. Ashcroft, No. 2:02 Civ. 801, at 1
(W.D. La. June 23, 2003); Roberts v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 1115, at 2 (W.D. La. June 21,
2003) (report and recommendation); Roberts, No. 03 Civ. 1115 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2003); Lo-
pez-Jaramillo v. Ashcroft, No. 2:03 Civ. 1013, at 1 (W.D. La. July 17, 2003).
45 See cases cited supra note 44.
46 Andrade, No. 2:03 Civ. 1307, at 1 (W.D. La. Aug. 25, 2003); Byªeld, No. 2:03 Civ. 1283,
at 1 (W.D. La. Aug. 14, 2003); Roberts, No. 03 Civ. 1115, at 2 (W.D. La. June 21, 2003) (re-
port and recommendation).
47 Telfort, No. 2:02 Civ. 801, at 1 (W.D. La. June 23, 2003); Lopez-Jaramillo, No. 2:03 Civ.
1013, at 1 (W.D. La. July 17, 2003). Many more petitioners might have sought a stay if the
standard pro se habeas form indicated that it was available. The WDLA requires pro se peti-
tioners to ªle their habeas petition on a standard form. It treats habeas ªlings that are not
on such forms, including those in transferred cases, as “deªcient pleadings.” On the stan-
dard form, there is no space to mark that one is seeking a stay nor is there any indication
that the petitioner could seek a stay.
48 See cases cited supra note 44.
49 See Andrade, No. 2:03 Civ. 1307, at 1 (W.D. La. Aug. 25, 2003) (Trimble, J.); Byªeld v.
Ashcroft, No. 2:03 Civ. 1283, at 1 (W.D. La. Aug. 14, 2003) (Minaldi, J.); Telfort v. Ashcroft,
No. 2:02 Civ. 801, at 1 (W.D. La. June 23, 2003) (Minaldi, J.); Telfort, No. 2:02 Civ. 801
(W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2003) (accepting proposed conclusions of law) (Trimble, J.); Roberts v.
Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 1115, at 2 (W.D. La. June 21, 2003) (report and recommendation);
Roberts, No. 03 Civ. 1115 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2003); Lopez-Jaramillo, No. 2:03 Civ. 1013, at 1
(W.D. La. July 17, 2003) (Minaldi, J.).
50 Andrade, No. 2:03 Civ. 1307, at 1 (W.D. La. Aug. 25, 2003); Byªeld, No. 2:03 Civ. 1283,
at 1 (W.D. La. Aug. 14, 2003); Roberts, No. 2:03 Civ. 1115, at 2 (W.D. La. June 21, 2003)
(report and recommendation).
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The following quotation from Lopez-Jaramillo v. Ashcroft is exem-
plary.51 Lopez challenged his removal on the ground that the ruling
in St. Cyr should extend to cases in which the individual made a deci-
sion to go to trial.52 With respect to his request for a stay, the court
stated:
This court lacks jurisdiction to grant petitioner the relief he
seeks. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) deprives federal courts of ju-
risdiction to entertain claims directed towards the “com-
mencement of proceedings,” the “adjudication of cases,” or
the “execution of a removal order.” Reno v. American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee, 119 S. Ct. 936 (1999); Alvidres-
Reyes v. Reno, 180 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 1999); Sharif v. Ashcroft,
280 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2002). Petitioner’s request for a stay is
directed at the Attorney General’s decision to execute peti-
tioner’s deportation/removal order. Sharif, supra at 787.53
Accordingly, the court rejected the request for a stay.54
What is striking about these decisions is that they adopt a reading
of INA § 242(g) that, to my knowledge, has not been advanced by the
government in any case, including those cases in which the WDLA has
announced that it has no power to issue a stay. In many cases, the
government argued that INA § 242(f) requires clear and convincing
evidence that the remand order is illegal.55 But it has never, to my
knowledge, argued that a habeas court has no jurisdiction to order a
stay in a case that challenges the legality of the removal order itself.
Furthermore, of the courts that have considered the question, a clear
majority have rejected the idea that INA § 242(f) imposes such a high
standard for stays, ªnding instead that stays of removal in habeas cases
                                                                                                                     
51 See Lopez-Jaramillo, No. 2:03 Civ. 1013, at 1 (W.D. La. July 17, 2003).
52 See Lopez-Jaramillo, No. 2:03 Civ. 1013 (W.D. La. July 11, 2003) (report and recom-
mendation). Courts are divided on the issue of whether St. Cyr extends to cases where the
detainee sought a trial, or whether it is limited to cases where the individual pleaded guilty
to a deportable offense. Compare Ponnapula v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 480, 494–97 (3d Cir.
2004) (extending the holding of St. Cyr), with Rankine v. Reno, 319 F.3d 93, 100–02 (2d
Cir. 2003) (limiting St. Cyr to its facts).
53 Lopez-Jaramillo, No. 2:03 Civ. 1013, at 1 (W.D. La. July 17, 2003).
54 Id.
55 See Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2003); Maharaj v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d
963, 965 (9th Cir. 2002); Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 2002); Beijani v.
INS, 271 F.3d 670, 687 (6th Cir. 2001).
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should be issued under the traditional standard for preliminary in-
junctions.56
The published cases the WDLA relied on in its general opinion as-
serting its lack of jurisdiction to issue stays all involved challenges to
removal that did not question the legality of the removal itself.57 For
instance, in Sharif v. Ashcroft, the petitioners had already pursued an
administrative reopening through which a stay was available.58 Thus,
the Seventh Circuit was not presented with a challenge to the underly-
ing removal order, but was asked only to stay removal.59 In contrast, in
cases where petitioners challenged the removal itself, the Seventh Cir-
cuit has issued stays of removal.60 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit found in
Alvidres-Reyes v. Reno that it lacked jurisdiction over a suit that it con-
strued as seeking to require commencement of proceedings against
individuals eligible to apply for a suspension of deportation.61
Speciªcally, it concluded that INA § 242(g) precluded suits that in-
volved the commencement of proceedings.62 Neither of these pub-
lished opinions concerned a challenge to the legality of a removal or-
der.63
                                                                                                                     
56 Four courts of appeals have ruled that the standard for a stay is similar to the stan-
dard for a preliminary injunction. See Arevalo, 344 F.3d at 7 (First Circuit); Maharaj, 295
F.3d at 965 (Ninth Circuit); Mohammed, 309 F.3d at 100 (Second Circuit); Beijani, 271 F.3d
at 687–88 (Sixth Circuit). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has adopted the
view that a stay requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence that the removal is
illegal. See Weng v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 287 F.3d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002). In each of these
cases, the reported decisions describe the government’s position as advocating a higher
standard of proof. See Arevalo, 344 F.3d at 7; Maharaj, 295 F.3d at 965; Mohammed, 309 F.3d
at 100; Weng, 287 F.3d at 1337; Beijani, 271 F.3d at 687–88. There is, however, no suggestion
that the district court lacks jurisdiction to enter a stay. See Arevalo, 344 F.3d at 7; Maharaj,
295 F.3d at 965; Mohammed, 309 F.3d at 100; Weng, 287 F.3d at 1337; Beijani, 271 F.3d at
687–88.
57 See Reno v. AADC, 525 U.S. 471 (1999); Sharif v. Ashcroft, 280 F.3d 786, 787 (7th Cir.
2002); Alvidres-Reyes v. Reno, 180 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 1999).
58 See Sharif, 280 F.3d at 788 (holding that an administrative basis existed for issuing a
stay).
59 See id. at 787. These factors distinguish the Sharif case from a typical habeas case that
challenges the legality of a removal order. Even in situations where the petitioner is only
seeking a stay, however, other courts have recognized the power of courts to enter stays
where necessary to preserve their jurisdiction. See, e.g., Michael v. INS, 48 F.3d 657, 663–64
(2d Cir. 1994).
60 See Arevalo, 344 F.3d at 7 (citing unpublished opinion of the Seventh Circuit).
61 Alvidres-Reyes, 180 F.3d at 205–06 (5th Cir. 1999).
62 See id. at 206.
63 See id. at 205; Sharif, 280 F.3d at 787. The WDLA decisions also cite to Reno v. AADC,
525 U.S. 471 (1999). See, e.g., Andrade v. Ashcroft, No. 2:03 Civ. 1307, at 1 (W.D. La. Aug.
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The WDLA also relies on an unpublished opinion issued in 2003
by the Fifth Circuit, Idokogi v. Ashcroft.64 The petitioner challenged his
removal on several bases, including a claim that he was not convicted
of an aggravated felony, and that he was therefore eligible for a hear-
ing on the cancellation of removal.65 In this way, Idokogi’s claim re-
sembled Enrico St. Cyr’s claim, as both petitioners alleged that they
had been denied an opportunity for a hearing on relief from re-
moval.66 Idokogi ªled his case originally in the Eastern District of New
York, where the court concluded that the case should be transferred
to the WDLA because Idokogi lacked ties to its jurisdiction.67 The
court transferred the case with a stay, which the WDLA promptly va-
cated.68 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit afªrmed the decision in an un-
published opinion.69 The panel acknowledged that the legal issue in
the case was whether the petitioner was properly classiªed as an “ag-
gravated felon,” a classiªcation that would render him ineligible for
cancellation of removal.70 Nonetheless, the panel stated that “the re-
lief sought by Idokogi is connected ‘directly and immediately’ with
the Attorney General’s decision to commence removal proceedings
against him . . . . The district court therefore correctly determined
that it lacked jurisdiction to stay the order of removal.”71 In subse-
quent decisions, the WDLA district court has read this statement from
a nonprecedential unpublished opinion as endorsing its view that re-
moval orders cannot be stayed.72
                                                                                                                     
25, 2003); Byªeld v. Ashcroft, No. 2:03 Civ. 1283, at 1 (W.D. La. Aug. 14, 2003); Telfort v.
Ashcroft, No. 2:02 Civ. 801, at 1 (W.D. La. June 23, 2003); Lopez-Jaramillo v. Ashcroft, No.
2:03 Civ. 1013, at 1 (W.D. La. July 17, 2003) The AADC court, however, drew a sharp dis-
tinction between its power when asked to review a discretionary decision to commence
removal proceedings and its powers when asked to review the outcome of those proceed-
ings. See 525 U.S. at 486–88. Nothing in AADC suggests that the removal order itself cannot
be reviewed. See id.
64 See, e.g., Andrade, No. 03 Civ. 1307; Byªeld, No. 03 Civ. 1283.
65 See Idokogi v. Ashcroft, No. 02-30553, at 1 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
66 See id. at 1, 2; St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293.
67 See Docket Proceedings at 3, Idokogi v. Ashcroft, No. 02 Civ. 205, PACER v.2.3a-
WDLA (docket as of Aug. 28, 2003).
68 See Idokogi, No. 02-30553, at 1.
69 See id. at 3.
70 Id. at 1; INA § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).
71 Idokogi, No. 02-30553, at 2–3.
72 See, e.g., Andrade v. Ashcroft, No. 2:03 Civ. 1307 (W.D. La. Aug. 15, 2003).
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Once stays are denied or lifted, a petitioner may be deported prior
to the adjudication of his or her habeas case, and the case may be dis-
missed for failure to prosecute.73 Often, the last entry on the docket
sheet discloses that mail has been returned to the court because the
petitioner is no longer at the Oakdale facility.74 In some cases, the entry
speciªcally states that the person was removed or deported.75
No evidence in any of the cases suggests that the transferring court
was aware the WDLA’s refusal to grant stays, or that the government
attorneys informed the court of this practice. Indeed, the WDLA’s
standard practice starkly contrasts with the norms regarding stays as
understood by many transferring courts. In the District of Connecticut,
for example, the court has noted the procedures instituted by the local
United States Attorney’s Ofªce that assure the court of notiªcation of
potential deportation of a person seeking a stay, even if the court has
yet to rule on the stay.76 That court plainly presumes that there will be
an adjudication on the merits of stay requests.77 Similarly, in the South-
ern District of New York, pro se cases of Oakdale detainees in the study
were typically transferred with stays by the Chief Judge’s order, with a
proviso allowing the government to seek vacatur of the stay for good
cause shown.78 This mechanism was designed to assure an adjudication
on the merits of a stay request.79 Once transferred to the WDLA, how-
ever, the stay is vacated sua sponte by the WDLA based on its absolute
position that jurisdiction to issue a stay is never present.80 The Southern
                                                                                                                     
73 See, e.g., Docket Proceedings at 3–4, Roberts v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 1115, PACER
v2.3a-WDLA (Sept. 9, 2003); Docket Proceedings at 3, Jacques v. Ashcroft, No. 01 Civ. 2160,
PACER v2.3a-WDLA (Nov. 6, 2002).
74 See sources cited supra note 73.
75 See sources cited supra note 73.
76 See Dennis v. INS, No. 301CV279SRU, 2002 WL 295100, at *2 (D. Conn. Feb. 19,
2002); Fuller v. INS, 144 F. Supp. 2d 72, 75 (D. Conn. 2000).
77 See Fuller, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 79.
78 See, e.g., Byªeld v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 4666, at 1 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2003) (renum-
bered No. 2:03 Civ. 1283).
79 See Smabaly v. Ashcroft, No. 02 Civ. 9353, 2002 WL 31729591, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3,
2002) (issuing a stay to preserve the court’s jurisdiction).
80 In the six months following St. Cyr, the Southern District of New York transferred
several cases with stays to the WDLA. See, e.g., Solis v. Ashcroft, No. 2:01 Civ. 1732, at 1
(W.D. La. Dec. 21, 2001); Bennett v. Ashcroft, No. 2:01 Civ. 1747, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 7,
2001); Riley v. Ashcroft, No. 01 Civ. 1549, at 1 (W.D. La. Dec. 7, 2001); Sanchez v. Ashcroft,
No. 01 Civ. 1476, at 1 (W.D. La. Sept. 13, 2001). Four stays were vacated sua sponte. See Solis,
No. 2:01 Civ. 1732, at 1; Bennett, No. 2:01 Civ. 1747, at 1; Riley, No. 01 Civ. 1549, at 1; San-
chez, No. 01 Civ. 1476, at 1.
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District has now altered its practice of sua sponte transfers and now re-
fers such cases to individual judges.81
The consequences of the WDLA’s practice are illustrated by a
case transferred from the U.S. District Court for the District of Con-
necticut. In Jacques v. Ashcroft, a Connecticut resident ªled a habeas
petition in the District of Connecticut shortly after the St. Cyr deci-
sion, based on the denial of eligibility for relief under section 212(c)
of the INA, a claim of derivative citizenship and other claims regard-
ing eligibility for relief from removal.82 The District of Connecticut
stayed removal.83 In response, the government sought transfer of the
case to the WDLA.84 It acknowledged that Jacques had a legitimate
claim for INA § 212(c) relief, because his removal order was based on
a plea that pre-dated the 1996 changes in the immigration laws.85 The
government argued, however, that the case should be transferred to
WDLA because Jacques was detained in the Oakdale facility.86 The
district judge transferred the case, stating that on transfer, any re-
manded proceeding could consider the citizenship claim.87 Five days
                                                                                                                     
81 Interview with James C. Francis IV, Magistrate Judge for the Southern District of
New York (Oct. 8, 2004).
82 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 289; Veriªed Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Com-
plaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Stay of Deportation at 4–10, Jacques v.
Ashcroft, No. 3:01 Civ. 958 (ªled D. Conn. May 25, 2001; renumbered No. 01 Civ. 2160).
According to the papers in the case, Jacques came to the United States at the age of ªve
and was raised in Stamford, Connecticut by his father and stepmother. Letter Re: Emer-
gency Stay of Deportation at 1, Jacques (received D. Conn. June 19, 2001) (No. 3:01 Civ.
958; renumbered No. 01 Civ. 2160). His father naturalized when he was ten. Id. Jacques
had ªled two prior habeas petitions, one in Connecticut and one in the WDLA. See
Veriªed Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief and Stay of Deportation at 4–10, Jacques (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2001) (No. 01 Civ. 2160).
The Connecticut petition was transferred to the WDLA. See id. In both cases, the WDLA
dismissed the case following the Fifth Circuit’s pre-St. Cyr rule that there was no habeas
jurisdiction for those persons barred by state from pursuing a petition for review in the
court of appeals. See Max-George v. Reno, 205 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2000), vacated and re-
manded, 533 U.S. 945 (2001) (articulating the pre-St. Cyr rule); Jacques, No. 01 Civ. 2160, at
1 (W.D. La Oct. 30, 2001) (dismissing ªrst habeas petition); Jacques, No. 01 Civ. 2160, at 1
(W.D. La. Jan. 28, 2002) (dismissing second habeas petition).
83 See Jacques, No. 2:01 Civ. 875, at 1 (W.D. La. May 11, 2001) (renumbered No. 01 Civ.
2160) (vacating stay issued by transferring court).
84 Response to Court Order to Show Cause at 1, Jacques (W.D. La. May 24, 2002) (No.
01 Civ. 2160).
85 See id. at 4.
86 Id. at 1–3.
87 See Jacques, No. 3:01 Civ. 958, at 1 (D. Conn. Sept. 26, 2001) (renumbered No. 01
Civ. 2160) (ordering transfer).
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later, the WDLA vacated the stay in accordance with its position that
no jurisdiction exists to grant stays in habeas petitions.88 The WDLA
later dismissed the citizenship claim with prejudice, stating that it
should have been pursued in a petition for review to the court of ap-
peals.89 Regarding the INA § 212(c) claim, the WDLA concluded that
the petitioner should seek to reopen before the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA).90 It therefore dismissed that claim as well.91 Jacques,
who, despite the vacatur of the stay, had not yet been deported, ªled a
motion to reopen, which the BIA denied.92 Jacques then ªled a sup-
plemental pleading in the district court.93 The court rejected it on the
ground that the case was closed.94 According to the docket sheet,
Jacques was removed before he received notice of the court’s rejec-
tion of his last pleading.95
Had the Connecticut district court known that the WDLA would
summarily vacate the stay and then dismiss rather than remand the
case, it might have retained jurisdiction to assure that Jacques re-
ceived a hearing on the merits of his claims.96 Indeed, given the gov-
ernment’s position in its papers ªled in the district court in Connecti-
cut, the transferring court likely presumed that there would be a
stipulated remand, and that the only question was which court would
“so order” the remand.97 Instead, Jacques lost the protection of the
stay and was deported without an adjudication of either his claim of
citizenship or his claim for relief under INA § 212(c).98
                                                                                                                     
88 See Jacques, No. 01 Civ. 2160, at 1 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2001) (denying motion for stay).
89 Jacques, No. 01 Civ. 2160, at 2 (W.D. La. Dec. 26, 2001) (report and recommenda-
tion).
90 Id. at 5.
91 Id.; Jacques, No. 01 Civ. 2160 (W.D. La. Jan. 28, 2002).
92 Information on the BIA motion was obtained through the BIA case information
phone number.
93 See Jacques, No. 01 Civ. 2160, at 1 (W.D. La. May 24, 2002).
94 Id.
95 See Docket Proceedings at 3, Jacques, No. 01 Civ. 2160, PACER v2.3a-WDLA (W.D. La.
Nov. 6, 2002).
96 See Jacques, No. 01 Civ. 958, at 1 (D. Conn. Oct. 16, 2001) (renumbered No. 01 Civ.
2160) (ordering transfer).
97 See Response to Court’s Order to Show Cause at 5, Jacques (No. 01 Civ. 958) (renum-
bered No. 01 Civ. 2160).
98 See Jacques, No. 01 Civ. 2160, at 3, 5 (W.D. La. Dec. 26, 2001) (report and recom-
mendation); Jacques, No. 01 Civ. 2160, at 1 (W.D. La. Jan. 28, 2002).
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In another case, Roberts v. Ashcroft, the petitioner claimed that he
was born in St. Thomas and was therefore a United States citizen and
not subject to deportation.99 Roberts ªled his habeas petition in Wash-
ington, D.C., and asserted that venue was proper in that district be-
cause it was his place of residence.100 The government, however,
sought transfer of the case to the WDLA, where the petitioner was de-
tained.101 The government opposed a stay, but stated that it had been
informed that deportation would not happen for sixty days; it asserted
as well that if a plan to deport Roberts materialized, the government
would notify the transferee court.102 No mention was made of the
WDLA’s practice of denying stays, which rendered such notice mean-
ingless.103 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia trans-
ferred the case to the WDLA and ordered a stay of deportation.104 Fol-
lowing transfer, the magistrate judge in the WDLA recommended
dismissal on the ground that the proper court was not the habeas
court but rather the court of appeals through a petition for review.105
He also recommended vacatur of the stay.106 Upon this recommenda-
tion, the petitioner abandoned his legal battle and was deported de-
spite his citizenship claim.107
Had the D.C. district court known that the WDLA would view itself
as lacking jurisdiction over the citizenship claim, perhaps it would have
retained the case or transferred it to another court that would exercise
jurisdiction. Indeed, the D.C. district court likely assumed that the
transferee court would be similarly concerned with assuring an adjudi-
cation of the merits of a claim of citizenship and, if necessary, would
                                                                                                                     
99 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and With Stay of Deportation Until Final Decision at 5, Roberts v. Ashcroft, No. 02
Civ. 2171 (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 2002) (renumbered No. 03 Civ. 1115).
100 Id. at 2.
101 United States’ Opposition to Petition to Stay Deportation at 1–2, Roberts, No. 02 Civ.
2171 (D.D.C. June 6, 2003) (renumbered No. 03 Civ. 1115).
102 Id.
103 See id.
104 See Roberts, No. 03 Civ. 1115, at 1 (W.D. La. July 21, 2003) (report and recommenda-
tion).
105 Id. at 2.
106 Id.
107 See Docket Proceedings at 3, Roberts, No. 03 Civ. 1115, PACER v2.3a-WDLA (Sept. 9,
2003).
30 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 25:13
transfer the case again with a stay.108 But the WDLA saw no need to as-
sure that any court would adjudicate the merits of the case.109
II. Zalawadia and the Consequences of Stay Denials
Without a stay, Oakdale detainees with cases in the Western Dis-
trict of Louisiana are subject to deportation prior to the adjudication of
their cases.110 In many cases, the last entry on the docket simply states
that mail from the court was returned stamped “removed.”111 Those
contesting their deportation, generally without counsel or resources, ap-
pear simply to have given up.
In a few rare cases, detainees have been represented by counsel
who continued to argue their cases even after deportation. Once such
detainee was Jaysukh Zalawadia, who received no stay and continued
to challenge his removal after he had been deported.112 Zalawadia was
represented by the same counsel who represented some of the indi-
viduals in the consolidated cases heard in St. Cyr.113 Zalawadia’s coun-
sel petitioned for writ of certiorari and continued to represent him
after his case was remanded to the lower courts.114 Ultimately, the
Fifth Circuit ruled that Zalawadia should have had a hearing on the
equities of his case prior to his deportation.115 But because he had
been deported, the court ruled that it would only vacate the removal
                                                                                                                     
108 There is a division of authority on whether a habeas court can entertain claims of
citizenship and nationality. Compare Lee v. Ashcroft, No. 01 CV. 0997, 2003 WL 21310247,
at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 27, 2003) (ªnding district court jurisdiction), with Marquez-Almanzar
v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 1601, 2003 WL 21283418, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 03, 2003) (ªnding
no district court jurisdiction and transferring to the Second Circuit). Those courts that
view the court of appeals as the proper jurisdiction frequently transfer cases to that court
when there is a citizenship question. See, e.g., Marquez-Almanzar, 2003 WL 21283418, at *7;
Alvarez-Garcia v. INS, 234 F. Supp. 2d 283, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Andrade v. Ashcroft,
270 F. Supp. 2d 344, 346 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating expectation that the WDLA would de-
termine whether transfer of a citizenship claim was appropriate).
109 See Roberts, No. 03 Civ. 1115, at 2 (W.D. La. July 21, 2003) (report and recommenda-
tion).
110 See sources cited supra note 73.
111 See, e.g., Docket Proceedings at 3, Jacques, No. 01 Civ. 2160, PACER v2.3a-WDLA
(docket as of Nov. 6, 2002).
112 Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 2004).
113 See id. at 293. The law ªrm of Bretz and Coven, LLP represented the petitioners in
Calcano-Martinez, which was consolidated with St. Cyr.
114 See Zalawadia, 371 F.3d at 296.
115 Id. at 301.
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order and would not order Zalawadia’s return or the provision of a
new hearing.116
Zalawadia underscores the critical role that stays play. Without a
stay, a noncitizen faces not just deportation but lack of access to a
practical remedy for the deportation.117 Those who had stays when St.
Cyr was decided received the beneªt of that decision.118 Those who
did not and were deported, at least in the Fifth Circuit, will not obtain
relief.119 Of course, powerful arguments refute Zalawadia’s broad lan-
guage. The general habeas statute provides that the court “may dis-
pose of the matter as law and justice requires.”120 Where the challenge
is to the removal order, it seems fairly obvious that the broad power to
do as “law and justice require” includes a remedy to the removal it-
self.121 But even if the Fifth Circuit retreats from the broad language
of the Zalawadia opinion, Oakdale detainees who are transferred to
the Western District of Louisiana presently face a district court that, as
a matter of policy, vacates stays and then refuses to provide adequate
relief even for those who continue to ªght their cases from abroad.122
III. Implications of Stay Practices for Choosing an
Appropriate Forum
The study of transferred cases shows that district courts should
understand that when they transfer a case of an Oakdale detainee to
the WDLA, they are basically allowing the government to deport that
individual without the possibility of a stay and without the possibility
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117 See id.
118 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001).
119 See, e.g., Zalawadia, 371 F.3d at 296.
120 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2000).
121 See id. The Zalawadia court makes several errors in its analysis. First, it assumes that
limits on the scope of review translate into limits on the remedial power of the court. See
Zalawadia, 371 F.3d at 300. The fact that habeas courts are limited in the kinds of issues
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ªnd a violation. Second, the Zalawadia court makes the mistake of assuming that jurisdic-
tion for a person who is no longer in physical custody is dependent on collateral conse-
quences. See id. Collateral consequences may be enough to keep jurisdiction, but they are
not the only restraints on liberty that give rise to habeas jurisdiction. Since habeas serves as
a method to review the legality of the removal order, it is the removal order itself that is
properly at issue, and for which the court can issue a remedy. See Morawetz, supra note 28,
at 10.
122 See supra note 24.
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of a judicial remedy requiring that person’s return. The question is:
does this matter? Do the consequences of the transfer have any bear-
ing on what courts should do?
After Padilla, there can be little question that it does matter. Padilla
makes it clear that rules for choosing the forum in habeas challenges
are not a matter of subject matter jurisdiction.123 Instead they are mat-
ters of convention in which an “immediate custodian” rule has emerged
for core cases that are simple challenges to physical custody.124 The cases
of Oakdale detainees illustrate how far immigration challenges are from
“core challenges” to present physical custody and how great the danger
is of distorting the rule of law through mindless application of an “im-
mediate custodian” rule.125 For Oakdale detainees, courts applying a
version of the immediate custodian rule have sent cases to be heard by
the court with the least connection to the case.126 The Western District
of Louisiana’s physical connection to the detainee is, at most, happen-
stance. Its practices seek to sever that physical relationship from the start
by failing to do anything to prevent deportation pending resolution of
the case.127 Meanwhile, allowing the government to achieve this result
through detention in Louisiana provides the Executive with the fright-
ening power to choose a court that will prevent the petitioner from ob-
taining relief. Hopefully, the greater message of the triumvirate of cases
announced in June 2004—namely that no government is above the
law—will prevent procedural rules that provide such insulation from
judicial scrutiny.128
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128 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004) (denying U.S. government at-
tempts to limit degree to which habeas courts can review claims brought by U.S. citizens
held as “enemy combatants”); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2688–89 (2004) (rejecting
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Outside of the immigration ªeld, the experience of the Oakdale
detainees should serve as a sober reminder of the degree to which sub-
stantive protection from illegal government action depends not just on
substantive judicial rulings, but also on the procedural rules that will
determine whether courts ever reach the merits of a case and will have
the power to remedy legal wrongs. Padilla-like rules, which allow the
government to choose the court that will review the legality of contro-
versial government policies, lend themselves to abuse.129 They provide
an easy means for government forum shopping that limits judicial scru-
tiny. Whether or not the Oakdale experience is the product of a con-
scious effort to choose a forum that would deprive access to a fair rul-
ing on the merits, or the happenstance of government detention
policies that had no connection to efforts to secure a litigation advan-
tage, the result is clear. When it is able to compel litigation in the West-
ern District of Louisiana, the government—whose powers the writ of
habeas corpus is designed to limit—has access to a court that views itself
as largely without power. These experiences should not be repeated.
                                                                                                                     
U.S. government argument that detainees held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba cannot bring
habeas corpus claims to challenge their detention); Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at, 2717 (acknowl-
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